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ABSTRACT
This paper proposes a model of smuggling consistent with the
coexistence of firms involved in strictly legal trade with firms
involved in smuggling.

A framework is presented in which a

firm's degree of risk aversion and the level of government
enforcement are the determining factors in the decision of the
firm to smuggle or not to smuggle.

The model demonstrates that

smuggling must be welfare enhancing or all smuggling activity
will end.
This paper also provides a theoretical analysis of the
effect enforcement has on smuggling and welfare.

Increased

enforcement is shown to have a negative effect on welfare.
Government enforcement is assumed to have two policy instruments
it can use to combat smuggling: 1) the probability of detection;
2) the monetary penalty.

The relative effectiveness of

government enforcement instruments in deterring smuggling is
shown to be dependent on the degree of firm risk aversion.
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SMUGGLING AND PARALLEL MARKETS FOR EXPORTS
by

Scott

w.

Fausti

Introduction
The literature on illegal transactions suggest that
smuggling may reduce welfare over the non-smuggling situation.
In this essay a model of firm behavior is developed which allows
smuggling to be a viable option in addition to legal trade for
the domestic firm involved in international trade.

The results

of the "parallel market" model developed in this essay indicate
that if smuggling is not welfare enhancing, regardless of the
real resource cost, smuggling will end.

In addition, the

parallel market model allows the effect of government enforcement
on smuggling to be examined.

The model demonstrates that

increased enforcement has a negative impact on smuggling and,
more importantly, a negative impact on welfare.
The seminal paper on illegal transactions by Bhagwati and
Hansen (1973) analyzed the welfare implications of smuggling for
a small country that imposed a non-prohibitive tariff on imports.
Their analysis produced two substantive results. First, under the
assumption of perfect competition in the domestic market for
imports and the presence of a domestic price differential between
legal and illegal goods, illegal trade will dominate the domestic
market for imports.
possible. 1

In this case a unique welfare ranking is not

Second, when it was assumed illegal goods sell at

the full duty domestic price, legal and illegal trade coexist in
the domestic market.

The presence of smuggling, however, has a

2

negative effect on welfare.

Bhagwati and Hansen's results cast

doubt on the widely held view that smuggling improves welfare in
that it constitutes a partial or total evasion of welfare

reducing tariffs. 2

One weakness of the Bhagwati and Hansen model is its
inability to sustain both legal and illegal trade when the
domestic price of illegal imports is below the theoretical full
duty price for imports.

In the real world, legal and illegal

trade coexist, with the domestic price of imports being below
what the theoretical full duty price should be.
Empirical evidence validating this phenomena is provided by
Richard Cooper's (1974) empirical study of import smuggling in
Indonesia.

Cooper examined the effect of smuggling on the

wholesale market price of goods subject to varying tariff levels.
Cooper's results revealed that the average wholesale market price
of a good subjected to a tariff was only 82% of what the good's
tariff inclusive price should be.
a tariff rate of 0% to 100%.

This result was for goods with

For goods that were subject to

tariffs of 100% to 200%, only 39% of the tariff increment above
100% was reflected in the average wholesale price.

An increase

in tariff rates above 258% resulted in a actual reduction in the
average wholesale price. 3
The first theoretical paper focusing on the domestic price
effect of smuggling was published by Pitt (1981) .

Pitt developed

a model of export smuggling based on a smuggling production
function for firms that use legal export trade as a cover for
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their illegal export trade.

For the smuggling firm, legal and

illegal exports become a joint product of the firm.

The average

price of the joint export product is greater than the price of
exports in the non-smuggling situation.

Price disparity is a

term Pitt coined for the empirically valid phenomenon of exports
selling above their theoretical full duty domestic price. 4
Pitt's model demonstrates that price disparity and the
coexistence of legal and illegal trade are possible.

Pitt

obtains this result because all firms in his model smuggle and
legal and illegal exports are joint products of exporting firms.
Pitt's model, however, incorporates passive government
enforcement and lacks a decision process to explain of why one
firm will smuggle and another will not. These characteristics of
Pitt's model produce smuggling•s ambiguous welfare effect when
smuggling incurs a real resource cost.
Martin and Panagariya (1984) introduced the crime theoretic
approach to the analysis of import smuggling.

This approach

explicitly allows them to incorporate the uncertainty associated
with smuggling.

As in the Pitt model, however, their analysis

fails to provide an explanation of why one firm will smuggle and
another will not.

The strong assumptions of firm risk

neutrality, that all import firms smuggle, and that the smuggling
firm sets its own probability of detection generate their
ambiguous welfare results.
The three major goals of this essay are: 1) to develop a
model that allows varying degrees of firm risk aversion to exist

4

in the export industry; 2) to provide an analysis of the
interaction effect of varying degrees of firm risk aversion with
different levels of government enforcement on total smuggling and
a country's social welfare; 3) to present a general explanation
of the coexistence of firms involved in legal trade only with
firms that smuggle when there is a tax wedge driven between the
world and domestic price of a good.
For the convenience of the reader an outline of the essay is
provided.

Section (2) develops the Pitt model of smuggling.

A

set of modifying assumptions are then introduced which allows the
formal development of the parallel market model in the next
section.

Section (3) formally develops the parallel market model

and then analyzes the welfare implications of the interaction
effect between the risk associated with smuggling and the
existence of parallel markets for exports.

Section (4) examines

the role of government enforcement policy and its effect on
social welfare in the parallel market model.

Section (5) gives a

summary of the results and discusses the policy implications of
those results.
Assumptions
The analysis begins with the Pitt model of smuggling.
Pitt's basic model represents the small country case with the
terms of trade fixed.

The country produces two traded goods, (X)

and (M) , an exportable and importable, respectively, with primary
factors in perfect competition.
out by identical exporting firms.

Production and trade are carried
Legal and illegal trade in

5

exports is carried out by the same firm.

All firms smuggle in

the Pitt model, and the law of one price holds in the domestic
economy.
It is assumed each firm can trade illegally according to
"Pitt's smuggling function",
(1)

s*

= G (L,S) .

The term (S*) is the quantity of good (X) smuggled, (L) is
the quantity of good (X) legally traded and (S) is the quantity
of good (X) input into smuggling activity.

The function (G) is

strictly concave and a twice differentiable linear homogenous
function.

The function (G) is also assumed to have the following

properties:
( 2) GL � 0,
(3) 1 � Gs � 0,

c 4)

s - s* � o.

Assumption (2) states that the marginal product of legal
trade used in smuggling is non-negative.

Assumption (3) states

that a unit increase in the smuggling input (S) results in a
positive, but less than or equal to, unit increase in actual ex
post smuggling. Assumption (4) prohibits the cost of smuggling
from being negative.

Pitt assumes the difference between ex-ante

smuggling (S) and ex-post smuggling, (s*) , consists of penalties
and confiscation or a mixture of real resource cost, penalties,
and confiscation.
The following assumptions are now made in order to transform
the Pitt model into the parallel market model of smuggling: 1)

6

smuggling by firms may not impose a real cost on society; 5

2)

firms have utility functions with respect to profits that exhibit
Von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility properties;

3)

smugglers

(firms) are natives and, therefore, their utility functions are
embodied in the country's social welfare function; 4)
taxes are assumed to be non-prohibitive; 5)

export

all firms in the

domestic export industry exhibit diminishing returns in
production, which implies (U) shaped average cost curves; 6)
firms must bear the risk of illegal activity and they can not
insure against criminal penalties; and 7) if the domestic
exporting firm decides to smuggle, it will then produce a joint
product, and legal trade will act as a cloak for the firm's
illegal activity.

The firm can use four methods to smuggle

exports: a) clandestine smuggling of exports; b) under-invoicing
of exports; c) falsely declared exports; d) under-assessment of
exports.
I assume that the difference between (S) and (S*) is a real
resource cost coming from either an excess transport cost
associated with illegal trade or from evasion tactics used to
escape detection. 6

The evasion cost is due to cloaking

activities used by smugglers to reduce the expected value of
punishment: µ= (P•F) . The variable (P) is the probability of
detection.

The variable (F) is the monetary penalty. Smugglers

use cloaking activities to decrease the value of (P) to less than
one.

Without cloaking activities, it is assumed (P) will be

equal to one for the smuggling firm.

Therefore, it is assumed

7

the expected value of punishment has a positive relationship with
the real resource cost associated with cloaking activities.
Hence, the smuggling function G (S, L; µ) is assumed to have the
following properties with respect to the exogenous variable (µ),
G'<O, G"<O.

The analysis in the next section begins by assuming that
smuggling does not incur a real cost over legal trade, i. e.
c s�s*). 7 This modification assumes that successful ex-post
smuggling is less than but approximately equal to ex-ante
smuggling to comply with the strict concavity assumption imposed
on the smuggling function (G).

This assumption allows an

externalization of the effect enforcement has on smuggling in the
Pitt model.
A Model of smuggling with Parallel Markets for
Exports and Risk Aversion
In all previous articles on illegal trade, except for the
one by Scholer (1989), the trading firm had no choice with
respect to smuggling. The assumption of parallel markets for
exports opens up the possibility of firm choice: strictly legal
trade or joint product export smuggling as in the Pitt model.
This process will generate two distinct channels through which
goods will flow.

Then, it is conceivable that the law of one

price is no longer valid inside the country.

There are several

domestic conditions which will promote the development of a
parallel market: 1) a domestic market for the export does not
exist; 2) all firms, by law must sell their output to the
government; and 3) ineffective enforcement of the tax laws.

8

It is assumed parallel markets for exports and the risk
associated with smuggling affect firm behavior.

In illegal trade

the risk is due to government enforcement of the export tax laws.
The firm's decision to become involved in illegal trade,
therefore, is based on the potential profits of smuggling and the
uncertainty of those profits.
Cooper (1974) alludes to a firm's "threshold of law
abidingness, " pertaining to a "threshold tariff."8

I assume

that the threshold export tax at which a firm will decide to
become involved in illegal trade is determined by the uncertainty
associated with illegal profits and the expected value of those
profits. An export tax set above this threshold will induce
illegal trade, as illegal gains outweigh the economic
consequences associated with being caught breaking the law.
It is assumed that each firm has a decision to make: the
firm can engage in the Pitt type of smuggling or the firm can
sell its output at the legal domestic export tax distorted price
(Pt ), pf • (l-t) = pt .

If the firm decides to smuggle, it receives

the weighted average price (P5 ) for its output, equation (8)
found below.

If the firm decides to stay involved in legal

trade, then strictly legal profits for the firm can be
represented by the variable (Y\),

(5) Max y l i = pf. (1-t) •X - C (X, P 1 ) •9

For simplicity let equation (6) represent the firm's profit
function for strictly legal export trade,
(6) y l i = y l i (Pt , p l ).

9

The variable (P1 ) is the price vector for domestic factor
inputs used in the domestic production of exports (X) , and (Pt )
is the exported goods tax inclusive price or full duty domestic
price of the domestically produced exported good (X) .

The

function C (X, P 1 ) is the firm's cost function, and it is assumed
the firm is a price taker in the domestic factor markets.

The

firm's domestic export production function is assumed to be
strictly concave and thus exhibits diminishing returns in
production.

This restriction on the firm's production function

guarantees the firm's average cost curves are (U) shaped. 10
The firm's expected utility of profit function for legal
trade is assumed to be twice differentiable and is denoted
[E (U (Yl i) )
activity.

= u\J.

Legal trade is assumed to be a risk free

If the firm decides to become involved in joint product
illegal trade, then its situation can be thought of as a lottery.
The expected value of the lottery is dependent on the following
variables,

(p 1 ,

The probability of apprehension (P) is

Y\, F 1 ).

determined by the government.

The ith firm assumes its

probability of being caught is (p,) .

Each firm can influence its

probability of success at smuggling by using cloaking activities.
The expected value of
the objective value of

(p)
( p)

for the industry, however, is equal to
set by the government.

The variable

(F1) is the monetary equivalent of the punishment imposed on the

i th firm by the government if it is caught in the illegal act of
smuggling.

Fines are considered a transfer to the government.

10
The variable (YS ,) represents illegal profits for the individual
profit maximizing firm,

(7) Max YS , = pf ·G (L, S) + pf . (1-t) •L - C (X, P 1 )

• 11

Equation (7) represents total profits earned if the firm is
successful in illegal trade.

Equation (7) implies that legal and

illegal trade in exports are considered a joint product of the
smuggling firm.

The firm's ex-ante output supply price is

determined by the weighted average of legal and illegal trade.
The smuggler determines his average selling price of output (Ps )
in order to calculate potential profits coming from successful
smuggling,
(8) ps = [Pf •s* / L+S] + [Pf • (1-t) •L / L+S].
For simplicity, let equation (9) represent the firm's profit
function for successful smuggling,
(9) Y\ = Y\ (PS , P 1 ).

By employing Hotelling's lemma it is possible to derive the
output supply functions and input demand functions from the
profit functions of legal and illegal trade, equations (10)
through (13) ,
(10)

aY (Ps, P 1 ) /aPs = ss c ps, P 1 ), S'>O, S">O, V ps>o,

(11)

- aY (Ps , P 1 ) /aP1 = x (Ps, P 1 ), x'<O, x"<O, V P 1 >>0,

(12)

aY (Pt , P 1 ) /aPt = Ls (Pt , P 1 ) L'>O, L">O, V p t>O,

(13)

-aY (Pt , P 1 ) /aPt = x (Pt , P 1 ) x'<O, x"<O, V P 1>>0.
The term (Ss) is the export supply function for firms that

engage in illegal joint product export trade.

The term (Ls ) is

the export supply function for firms that do not smuggle exports.
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The expected value and variance of profit when the ith firm
is involved in illegal trade, assuming there is not a real
resource cost associated with smuggling, is given in equations
(14) and (15) ,
(14)

E (Y\) = pi• (Y\-Fi) + (1-p i ) • Y\ = Y\-Pi•F;,

( 15)

VAR (Y\) = p i • ( 1-p i) • F2 i •

The expected utility function for the firm if it smuggles,

is assumed to be twice differentiable and is defined by equation
(16)
(16)

I

E (us i ) = p i • U i ( ys 1 - Fi) + (1-p i ) • Ui (Y\) •

Conditions (17) and (18) hold given that the marginal utility of
profit is positive as defined by condition (19) ,
(17)
(18)
(19)

8E (usi) /8pi = U d y si-Fi) - Ui (Y\) < 0,
8E (Us i) /8Fi = -pi•U'i (Ys i-Fi) < O,

8 E (U\) /8y s i = [ pi • U 'i ( Y\-Fi) + (1-p i )

•

U 'i (Y\) ]

> 0•

The ith firm bases its decision to become involved in smuggling
by comparing expected utilities derived from legal profit with
those derived from illegal profit.

Therefore, the firm is faced

with a random profit (Ys i) and a certain profit (Yu) .

The firm's

decision mechanism is based on a comparison of (Ysi) and (Y l i) ,
and this comparison is given in equation (20) ,
(20) E (y s i) - y l i =

7r i •

Applying the theoretical results pertaining to risk and risk
aversion developed by Pratt (1964) , joint product illegal trade
profits represent an uncertain prospect and legal trade profits
represent a certain prospect.

The term (1r1) represents the
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difference between the expected value of illegal profit and legal
profit.

It follows that there does exist a (7rt = 7f;) such that

the firm is indifferent between legal and illegal trade.

The

level of (7rt) depends on the ith firm's attitude toward risk.

By

applying Pratt's results, it is reasonable to define (7rt) as a
risk premium.

The functional form of (7r*) is given in equation

(2 1),
(2 1) 7T;

R

=

= (1/2) •VAR (Y8 1. )

•

-{U" (Y L 1.) + U' (Y L 1.)}.

By employing the standard measure of absolute risk aversion,
-[U" (Y)/U' (Y)], as the measure of the ith firm's attitude

toward risk, the following conditions arise.

The value of (,r/)

for the i th firm will be negative if (U">O) ; positive if (U"<O) ;
and zero if (U"=O) .

This implies that the ith firm prefers,

averts or is neutral towards risk respectively.

The variable

(,rt) represents the insurance premium the firm would be willing
to pay if it could insure itself against criminal penalties.
Therefore, (7rt) represents the minimum level of risk premium
necessary to induce the it h firm into smuggling.

This implies

that in equilibrium, at the margin, smugglers that are risk
averse earn higher profits then they could in legal activities.
Smugglers who are risk preferrers earn lower profits then they
could in legal trade.

Smugglers who are risk neutral earn the

same amount of profits as they could in legal trade.

Hence, (,r*)

serves as proxy for Cooper's "threshold of law abidingness. " 12
Whenever (,r; > ,rt) , the firm will become involved in smuggling if
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the firm is assumed to be risk averse or risk neutral as the
following condition implies, (U" SO) .
It is now assumed that individual attitudes toward risk vary
among domestic firms.

Let (R) be a random variable that has a

probability density function that generates a finite variance
distribution.

Attitudes range from risk neutrality (R� O) to

extreme risk aversion (R�
distribution for (R) .

�>

with a lower bounded finite variance

This assumption implies individual firms

displaying risk neutrality or extreme risk aversion are a small
proportion of the export industry.
To expand on the concept of industry attitudes towards risk
it is assumed that the expected value for the distribution of (R)
is equal to (r, r>O) , as defined by equation (22) below.

Equation

(22) implies that the industry's average view towards the risk
associated with smuggling is risk averse,

J

(22) E (R) =0 ., r·fr (r) dr = r.

From the initial assumption of identical firms with varying
degrees of risk aversion, the expected value and variance of
illegal profits for the representative firm are,
( 2 3 ) E (Y8 ) = p • ( Y8 - F)+ ( 1- p) • Y8 ,
( 2 4 ) VAR (Y8 ) = p • ( 1- p ) • F2 •

The decision of an individual firm to continue in only legal
trade or to engage in smuggling is based on the comparison of
legal profits to the expected value of illegal profits earned by
smuggling. This decision process is represented by equations (25)
and (26) ,

14
( 2 5) E(Y8 )

-

Y L = 1r,

(2 6) ,r* = (1/2) •VAR(Y8 )

•

-{U"(Y l ) + U'(Y l )}.

From equation (2 6) it is possible to derive (1r*) , the
minimum risk premium at which an individual firm in the industry
is indifferent to legal or illegal trade .

The level of (1r*)

depends on the firms attitude towards risk, which is determined
by (R) .
It is assumed that the distribution of the attitudes towards
risk for all firms in the industry is given by the probability
density function, fr (r) . The distribution of (R) is assumed to
have a finite variance distribution for the industry. This
implies that (1r*) also has a finite variance distribution for the
industry and has a lower bound of zero, thus the minimum risk
premium must always be non-negative.

The probability density

function for (1r*) can be defined as ft' (1r*) •13
*
For example, assume that, on average, the minimum risk
premium for the industry is (1rT) .

This implies that the expected

value of (1r*) is equal to (,r T) , as given by condition (27) ,
(27) E (1r*) =0JG 1r*

•

f1'. (,r* )

Assume however, that the actual risk premium generated by

the export tax, (1r) , is some positive value, say (1r 1).

Then

there will be a set of risk averse firms involved in smuggling.
The proportion of the industry involved in smuggling can be
determined by the definite integral defined below,

( 2 8)

Cl = 0fT*=T1

15
fT (,r*) d,r* •
*

The proportion of the industry involved only in legal trade
is, therefore,
(29) (1-Cl) =

J
*= T 1

T

c,

fT (,r*) d,r*.
*

In equation (29) , the term (1-c.r) represents those firms in
the industry for which the level of risk aversion is too high, so
they simply do not smuggle.

The variable (c.r) represents that

proportion of the industry involved in smuggling.

This implies

(c.r) represents the proportion of exporting firms selling exports
at an average price greater than the selling price of exports for
firms that do not smuggle.

one minus (c.r) represents the

proportion of exporting firms selling exports at the theoretical
full duty domestic price. Equations (28) and (29) determine the
average domestic wholesale price of exports, equation (30) . 14
Equation (30) represents a weighted average of trade carried out
by the two types of firms in the industry, firms strictly in
legal trade and the firms involved in both legal and illegal
trade,
(30) AWP = c.r•P5 + (1-c.r) . pt . 15
Equations (8) and (30) demonstrate that as the export tax
progressively increases, the price of goods exported by the
smuggling firm declines by less than the increase in the export
tax.

This causes (c.r) to increase, causing the average domestic

wholesale price of exports to decline by a progressively smaller
amount than the increase in the export tax.

This result implies

that the joint product smuggling firm bears only a proportion of
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the tax and the legal trade only firm bears the full burden of
the tax.

This situation forces more firms into smuggling.

This

is consistent with the empirical results of Cooper for Indonesian
imports subject to varying tariff levels.
This section has developed a model of industry behavior
which allows firms involved only in legal trade to coexist with
firms involved in joint product smuggling.

The domestic average

wholesale of exports is endogenously determined.

These results

are obtained because the decision mechanism developed in the
model explains why one firm will smuggle and another will not.
The methodology used in this section extended the work of
Bhagwati and Hansen, Martin and Panagariya, and Pitt.

This

extension provides a plausible explanation for the empirically
valid case of countries with low tariff or export tax ceilings
experiencing little or no smuggling and countries with high
tariff or export tax ceilings having a continuing problem with
smuggling.
In a recent article on import smuggling, the result of
strictly legal traders coexisting with firms that smuggle was
demonstrated in a stochastic model of firm behavior developed by
Scholer (1989).

Scholar assumes varying cost structures between

importing firms and varying attitudes toward the risk associated
with smuggling by the individual firm's management.

These

assumptions allow firms in strictly legal trade to coexist in the
domestic market with firms that smuggle.

The decision to smuggle

in Scholer's model is based on the comparison of expected unit
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cost of smuggling to the tariff and the firm's attitude toward
the risk associated with smuggling.

Scholer, however, does not

fully develop the Arrow-Pratt methodology that would provide a
stronger theoretical foundation for his firm's decision process.
Another weakness of the Scholer model is the way smuggling
cost are defined.

Scholer assumes the cost of smuggling is the

value of expected punishment, i.e., the international value of
illegal import confiscations.

The real resource cost associated

with smuggling in Scholer•s model is generated when the
government destroys the international value of expected illegal
import confiscations.

This is a very strong assumption, and

Scholer notes that if this assumption is relaxed his results may
change.
The Welfare Effect of smuggling

In the last section it was demonstrated that whenever
(� > w*)

for any firm or firms, a proportion of the industry

will be involved in smuggling.

The stage is now set for an

examination of how the introduction of smuggling affects total
exports, denoted (I).

The small country assumption made earlier

implies that the demand for exports is perfectly elastic. The
amount of exports is therefore determined by supply.

Assuming

that the level of total exports, after the export tax is levied
but before smuggling is introduced, is equal to xL1 ,
(31)

r, = xL,.
After smuggling is introduced, the level of total exports is

equal to the sum of legal and illegal trade,

(32)

12 =

x\

+

18

x\.

Assuming the supply of total exports has a positive relationship
with the price of exports, one would expect that whenever (Pawp �
P t ) then (I2

�

of exports.

I 1 ) : (P8wp) represents the average wholesale price

Given that (X\ � 0) , then X\ + X\ � I 1, or

equivalently, X52 � I1 - xL2•

Using (31) , this implies condition

(33) ,
L
s
c 33) x 2 � x 1 - x\ •

Equation

(33)

demonstrates that the unit volume of illegal

trade is greater than the change in unit volume of legal trade.
However, as in Pitt's paper, it can not be determined if legal
trade increases or decreases because of the change in relative
prices; thus, the effect on export tax revenues is ambiguous. 16
The welfare effect of smuggling with parallel markets and
varying degrees of risk aversion will now be examined.

The

analysis begins from a export tax distorted equilibrium point
depicted in figure (1) in appendix (C) : production and
consumption are equal to (Pt , c t) , and welfare is equal to (Vt) .
The term (Vt) is an ex-post indirect social welfare function and
is defined as [V (AWP, Y) ].
In the non-smuggling case, the full duty price of exports
(Pt) is the average wholesale price of exports (AWP) .

The

variable (Y) represents income earned by the traded goods
industry and government revenues earned from export tax revenues
and fines collected. 17 The function (V) is assumed to be twice
continuously differentiable and non-increasing in (AWP) and non-

19
decreasing in (Y) .

The introduction of smuggling is assumed to

cause a domestic output supply price differential for domestic
firms producing exports, (F8 >Pt) .
Assuming that smugglers do not incur a real resource cost
over legal trade, the cost of smuggling is penalties and
confiscation.

The magnitude of the cost is determined by the

fixed level of government enforcement.

Therefore the aggregate

rate of transformation in trade is the free trade terms of trade.
Production and consumption will be equal to (paw�) and (Ca�) and
welfare at (Va�) .

The introduction of smuggling improves

welfare over the non-smuggling situation, (Va� > vt) as shown in
figure (1) . 18
If it is assumed government enforcement imposes a real cost
on smuggling, as it was assumed in the earlier literature, then
welfare levels are bounded by cvaw�) and (Vt ) .

This can be

demonstrated by first assuming the real cost of smuggling is due
to real resources being used up in evasion or cloaking
activities.

Second, assume the expected value of punishment,

(µ=p•F) , is used by smugglers to determine the real resource cost
of evasion tactics.

As (p) or (F) increases, the value of c s*)

declines as (Gs) declines; thus, (F8) declines, as shown in
equation (8) .

Equations (19) and (10) imply expected illegal

profits decline and the output from firms involved in illegal
trade declines respectively.

Therefore, the risk premium earned

from smuggling is lower, causing the most risk averse smugglers
to end their illegal activity.

With fewer firms smuggling, the
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average wholesale price of exports will decline and domestic
relative prices will deteriorate, welfare will decline as a
result of the introduction of real cost, (Vawp0 > V8wp1 ) (see figure
1) •

The cost of smuggling is a mix of real resource cost and
penalties-confiscation, with legal and illegal firms coexisting
in the domestic market. 19

Therefore production and prices are

independent of the cost mix but are not independent of the firm
mix.

Welfare is bounded by the cost and firm mix.

This implies

that as the level of real cost imposed on smuggling by
enforcement approaches the export tax, the risk premium earned
from smuggling is approaching zero.

As the risk premium earned

from smuggling declines, the number of firms smuggling declines.
As firms switch to legal trade only, the domestic average
wholesale price of exports approaches the full duty price (Pt ) .
Once the real cost of smuggling exceeds the export tax, all
smuggling will be eliminated.
at (Pt, ct) and welfare (Vt) .

Production and consumption will be
The export tax distorted

equilibrium will be the final result.
The introduction of parallel markets for exports and varying
degrees of risk aversion among exporting firms bounds the welfare
levels associated with the coexistence of smuggling and strictly
legal trade.

The welfare boundaries are: an upper bound of

(P8wp0, cawpO, V8wp0) and a lower bound of (Pt , ct , vt ) , as depicted in
figure (1) .

The parallel market generates this result because

the cost of smuggling to the firm represents a mix of a real
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resource cos t and penalties -confiscations. This cost mix is
imposed on the smuggling firm by the government.

Simply s tated,

for the smuggling firm with respect to smuggling profits, the
cost mix is irrelevant to the firm's decis ion to s muggle.
It has been demonstrated that a real cost imposed on
smuggling by government enforcement can not reduce welfare below
the original export tax dis torted welfare level.

This approach

extends the analysis of Martin and Panagariya, Bhagwati and
Hansen, and Pitt.

The welfare results of these authors could be

duplicated in the parallel market model by assuming that at least
a proportion of the firms in the export indus try are ris k
seeking.

This assumption produces the ambiguous welfare result

arrived at in the earlier literature.

Therefore, it is the overt

or implied assumption of the exporting firm's attitude toward
risk generating the ambiguous welfare results found in the
earlier literature.�
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The Welfare Effect of Govermaent Enforcement
The welfare analysis of smuggling in the economic literature
has ignored the interaction between government enforcement and
illegal transactions. 21 However, the Bhagwati and Hansen result
of "the less smuggling the better" implies that government action
should be taken against smugglers.
For the purpose of simplifying the analysis of this
interaction, assume that government enforcement effort can be
increased without any significant increase in cost.

The

government agency responsible for the enforcement of the export
tax laws and reducing smuggling has three policy instruments at
its disposal.

First, it can increase enforcement activity to

increase the probability of apprehending smugglers. Second, the
government can increase the penalty for smuggling.
government can lower the tax on exports.

Third, the

Based on the earlier

results that smuggling reduces the negative welfare effect of the
export tax, the welfare effect of changing each policy instrument
is examined below.
The result of increasing the tax on exported goods in the
parallel market model causes a decline in expected profits for
smugglers and a decline in profits for firms involved in legal
trade only.

This counter intuitive effect is the result of a

fixed international price for the small country's exports and the
smuggling firm producing a joint product for export. Equation (7)
demonstrates that for a fixed level of domestic production the
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smuggling firm's successful smuggling profit level declines when
the export tax is increased.
Equation (8) demonstrates, however, that the decline in (Ps)
will be less than the decline in (P t). This implies that the risk
premium earned from smuggling, (•),
more firms to smuggle.

will increase and induce

Total exports will decline, but the

smuggler's market share will increase. This is what Cooper calls
"the secondary effect": "With competition from smuggling of any
type, what appears to an indirect tax, the export tax, becomes a
direct tax on the income of he who pays it, for he can not pass
it on to his customers. 1122

The result of (Ps) declining by less

than the increase in the export tax in the parallel market model
is consistent with Cooper's empirical result of the domestic
average wholesale price of imports increasing by less than the
increase in the tariff.
Increasing government enforcement activity increases the
probability of being caught in the illegal act of smuggling.

As

demonstrated in equations (14) and (17), increasing the
probability of apprehension reduces expected profits and expected
utility of illegal trade.

This causes the number of firms

involved in illegal trade to decline.

Therefore, the welfare

effect of an increase in the probability of apprehension is
negative with respect to the results of the previous section.
If government enforcement is able to raise the probability
of apprehension to one, illegal profits would equal (Y s-F) for
firms involved in illegal activity.

Firms would then base their
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decision on whether to be involved in legal or illegal trade on a
simple comparison between (Y5-F) and (Y t ) .

Government could then

eliminate illegal trade by setting the monetary penalty high
enough so that (Y l ) > (Y8-F) , for all firms.

On the other hand,

if government set (p=O) , and if (Y1 > y t ) , then all firms will
smuggle.

In this situation, assuming perfect competition and no

real cost incurred in smuggling, the country would attain a free
trade equilibrium.
An increase in the monetary penalty (F) for firms caught in
illegal trade lowers the expected profits and expected utility of
profits for firms involved in illegal trade, as demonstrated in
equations (14) and (18) .
in illegal trade decline.

Therefore, the number of firms involved
Thus, the welfare effect of an

increase in the monetary penalty is negative with respect to the
earlier results of this essay.
Setting the monetary penalty at zero would eliminate legal
trade and bring about a free trade equilibrium, if (Y1 > Y 1 ).
Setting the monetary penalty at infinity would eliminate all
illegal trade.

The export tax distorted equilibrium would be

attained, if the probability of detection is non-zero.
The welfare results arising from a change in government
enforcement in the parallel market model are in sharp contrast to
the ambiguous welfare results found in the earlier literature.
In the parallel market model, as the real resource cost increases
from increased enforcement, risk averse firms begin to switch
from illegal to legal trade.

With this assumption incorporated
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into the model, increased enforcement has an unambiguous negative
welfare effect.

Government not only affects expected profits

from smuggling, but also imposes an increase in real cost on
smuggling that is reflected in the smuggling function (G) .

Once

the increase in real resource cost associated with smuggling
becomes greater than the extra revenues earned from smuggling,
all smuggling will end, if (U"<O) .
Another interesting issue concerning government policy and
smuggling is which policy tool is most effective in reducing
smuggling.

Extending the research of Becker (1968) , the

effectiveness of

(p)

and (F) in reducing the amount of smuggling

depends on the attitude toward risk of the traded goods industry.
Equations (34) and (35) below are elasticity measures for the
expected utility of illegal profits with respect to the policy
instruments (P) and (F) ,
(34)

-BE (U) /Bp • p/U = {U (Y5 )- U ( Y5-F) } • p/U,

(35)

-BE (U) /BF • F/U = p • U' (Y5-F) • F/U.
It is possible to use equations (34) and (35) to determine

which government policy instrument is most effective in reducing
smuggling.

A direct comparison of equations (34) and (35) ,

results in condition (36) .

It is now possible to perform an

algebraic manipulation to arrive at condition (37) .

Condition

(37) demonstrates that the individual relative effectiveness of
the enforcement policy instruments is contingent on the attitude
of the traded goods industry toward the risk associated with
smuggling, (U" >

o, u"

=

o, u"

< O) ,

(36) {U (Y 8
(37) {U (Y 5 )
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>

U (Y 8-F)} • p/U �

-

-

p • U' (Y 8-F) • F/U,

U (Y5-F)} / F

Equation (37) reveals that a one percent increase in (p)
generates a larger percentage reduction in smuggling than a one
percent increase in (F), if the
preference for risk.

traded goods industry has a

This occurs because the decline in expected

utility from smuggling profits is greater from the increase in
(p).

If the traded goods industry is risk averse, then a one

percent increase in (p) generates a smaller percentage reduction
in smuggling than a one percent increase in (F).
The above analysis has produced a very interesting result
with regards to policy instrument choice.

Assume that

clandestine smuggling is carried out by non-risk averse criminal
elements in a society.

Assume the type of smuggling that uses

under-invoicing, under-assessment and false declaration is
carried out by risk averse legitimate firms.

If increased use of

policy enforcement instruments has a zero or equal cost,
government could then choose the instrument which is most
effective against the type of smuggling most prevalent in its
economy.
One other comparison can be made.

The elasticity measure

for the expected utility of illegal profit, equation (38), with
respect to the export tax is greater than the elasticities of the
enforcement policy instruments,
(38) -8E (U)/8t • t/U = {-p•U' (Y8-F) • dy/dP 8

(1-p) • U' (Y5 )

•

dy/dP 8

•

dP5 /dt} • t/U.

•

dP8/dt -
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The comparison of equation (38) to equations (34) and (35)
demonstrates that reducing the export tax by one percent
generates a larger percentage reduction in smuggling than does a
one percent increase in government enforcement. This result holds
if it is assumed, (U" SO).
Sheikh (1990) used a variant of Tobin's (1958) portfolio
selection risk model to investigate smuggling.

The mean-variance

methodology allowed Sheikh to reexamine the theoretical results
of the smuggling literature, and he concludes that all existing
models over predict the possible positive welfare effects of
smuggling because the introduction of risk lowers welfare by its
mere presence.

Sheikh's model, however, does not provide an

explanation for the coexistence of strictly legal firms with
smuggling firms in the domestic market.

He does, however,

demonstrate that when smugglers are risk averse, increasing
punishment is more effective in controlling smuggling than
increases in the probability of detection.

I arrive at the same

result in equation (38) by using the Arrow-Pratt methodology to
model the risk associated with smuggling.
The mean-variance approach has several weakness that were
not addressed by Sheikh.

The literature on "choice under

uncertainty" reveals that generally the mean-variance approach
will not be able to reproduce the "true" rankings of the complete
distributions generated by the expected utility hypothesis
approach. 24

The mean-variance approach, when used to model the

risk associated with smuggling, will only produce suitable
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approximations to the expected utility approach under one of the
following conditions:

1) risks are small in some sense; 2) the

distribution of smuggling profits must be normal; 3) the
smuggling firm's utility function is quadratic. Sheikh's mean
variance model fails to make the necessary assumptions to meet
any one of these three conditions.
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Summary
The purpose of this essay is to extend the analysis of
Bhagwati and Hansen and other economists working on the welfare
effect of illegal transactions.

This essay's analysis began with

the construction of the parallel market model for export
smuggling.

The results of the model are as follows: 1)

the

coexistence of legal and illegal trade in the domestic market for
exports is possible when a domestic price differential exists; 2)
smuggling is welfare enhancing, irrespective of the real resource
cost associated with it, or smuggling will end: 3)

increased

government enforcement against smuggling has an unambiguously
negative effect on welfare and smuggling market share: 4) the
relative effectiveness of enforcement instruments is dependent on
the risk preference of smugglers; and 5) the ambiguous welfare
results attributed to smuggling in the earlier literature are the
direct consequence of not addressing the risk issue associated
with smuggling.
The basic conclusion of the essay for most situations is
that smuggling is desirable over non-smuggling.

The basic policy

conclusion for lesser developed countries is clear.

Lesser

developed countries should not rush into a policy of eliminating
smuggling without considering other courses of action.
Otherwise, they may inflict a welfare loss upon their economies.
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Appendix (A)
The profit maximization first order condition for equation
(5) is,
(la) a y L;ax= pf . c 1-t) - C/ = o .
The profit maximization second order condition for equation
(5)

is,

c 2 a ) a 2Y;a x2 = -c/ < o .

The second order condition for profit maximization holds for
the legal trade only exporting firm under the assumption that the
domestic export production function for the firm is strictly
concave and therefore the firm has an upward sloping marginal
cost curve, (C/ > 0) .

Under the assumption that second order

conditions given in equation (2a) hold, the legal trade only
firm's profit function represented by equation (6) is well
behaved.
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Appendix (B)
The profit maximization first order conditions for equation
(7) are,

(lb) 8Y/8L= pf . cl + pf . (1-t) - Cx' = O,
(2b ) 8Y/8S= pf . cs - Cx' = o.

The profit maximization second order conditions for equation

(7) are,

( 3b) 8 2Y/8L2= p f•GLL - Cx ff < 0 I
(4 b )

a 2Y/8 L8 S=

p f•GLS - C/ < 0 ,

(s b) a2y; as 2= pf · GSS - cX ff < o I

(6b) a2y; asaL= pf . csl - c/ < o.
The partial derivative (Gs) is the marginal product of ex

ante smuggling in production of successful ex-post smuggling and
is assumed to be positive.

The partial derivative (GL) is the

marginal product of legal trade in production of successful ex
post smuggling and is assumed to be positive.

The partial

derivative (Cx' > is the marginal cost of domestic export
production and is assumed to be positive.

The second order

partial derivatives (G86 ) and (GLL) are assumed to be negative

because of the strict concavity assumption imposed on (G) . The

cross partial derivatives, (GsL ' GL 8 )

,

are assumed positive and

small. This implies that the marginal productivity of either
input increases if the other input is increased.

The second

order partial derivative (Cxff > represents the slope of the firm's
marginal cost curve for domestic export production and is assumed
to be positive because of the strict concavity assumption imposed
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on the exporting firm's production function for the domestic
production of exports. The second order conditions for profit
maximization hold when it is assumed that the cross partial
derivatives are positive and small, and it should be noted that
it is assumed that changing (L) or (S) implies the production of
exports (X) must increase.

( 7 b)

A =

P f • GLL -cx II

pf • GLs - Cx "

pf · G SL

pf • GSS -CX "

- cX

II

J

,

DET (A) > O.

Under the assumption that second order conditions given in
equation (7b) hold, the smuggling firm's profit function
represented by equation (9) is well behaved.
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Append ix ( C )
Figure ( 1 )
EXPORTS

v awp

V

T

awp 1

IMPORTS

The symbols ( T , T) represent the product ion poss ib i l it ies
front i er for a sma l l country .

The vari ables ( P f , cf , Vf )

represent the free trade equ i l ibrium pos i t ion for the sma l l
country .

The var i ab l es ( P t , ct , vt } represent the non- smugg l ing

tax d i storted equ i l ibrium posit ion for the sma l l country .

The

variables ( P awpo , c awpo , vawpo) repres ent the smugg l i ng equ i l ibr ium
posi t ion when smugg l ing does not incur a rea l resource cost over
lega l trade and strictly legal trade is coexi st i ng with j o int
product i l l egal trade .

The symbo l ( B ) represents the i n ferior

aggregate rate of transformation curve for smugg l ing when

.
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smuggling incurs a real resource cost greater than legal trade .
The variable

( Q8 )

represents the share of the export market that

j oint product smugglers control. Strictly legal trade wil l take
equilibrium consumption to ( Cawp1 ) . Equilibrium domestic relative

prices and welfare are (F8wp1 ) and {V8wp1 ) respectively. The welfare

rankings for the different scenarios is clearly demonstrated in
figure (1) .
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End.notes

* · I wish to thank Donald Coes, Robert Gillespie, Earl Grinols,
Stan Herren, and the two anonymous referees for their comments. Any
remaining errors are my responsibility.
1. An implicit assumption of the Bhagwati and Hansen model is that
the real cost of smuggling is equal to the tariff.
2. See Bhagwati and Hansen (197 3) , p. 17 2.
3. See Cooper (1974) , pp. 188-189.
4. Pitt (1981) provides empirical evidence of price disparity
occurring in the Indonesian domestic market for commercial rubber.
5. Deardorff and stolper (1988) and Cooper (1974)
smuggling may not impose a real cost on society.

argue that

6. The real resource cost may take the form of special packing
costs necessary to hide smuggled goods. It could also come from
shipping goods out of or into clandestine ports to avoid detection.
7. We appeal to the arguments presented against an excessive real
resource cost associated with smuggling in the articles by Cooper
(1974) and Deardorff and stolper (1988) for this assumption.
8. See Cooper (1974) , p. 190.
9. The cost function is assumed to be twice differentiable, and
cost minimization is assured by the assumption that the firm ' s
production function for the domestic production of exports is
strictly concave. The first and second order conditions for profit
maximization are given in appendix (A) .
10. The cost function for the firm is assumed to represent the
minimum production cost associated with a specific level of output
(X) • The cost function embodies the assumption of strict concavity
of the firm ' s production function and therefore produces (U) shaped
average cost curves for the domestic export producing firm
regardless of whether the firm smuggles or not. This assumption
assures an interior maximum exists for the firm ' s profit function.
11. The first and second order conditions are given in appendix
(B) . Note that X = L+S.
12. See Cooper (1974) , p. 190.

13. It should be noted that as the expected value of (R) for the
industry increases, the expected value of c �*) for the industry
will also increase and therefore the number of firms smuggling must
decline.
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14. I shall assume that each exporting firm has equal weight in
determining the domestic average wholesale price of exports .
15 . Pitt (1981) , p. 450.
16. Pitt (1981) , p. 454 .
17. It should be noted that fines will be zero in the non-smuggling
case.
18. The mathematical model developed here examines export
smuggling ; however, the geometry used in figure (1) applies equally
to import and export smuggling in a manner analogous to the
symmetry results demonstrated by Lerner (1936) for import and
export taxes.
19.
The real resource cost of smuggling is the excess cost
incurred over legal trade and is due to the cloaking activities
employed to hide illegal activity from government enforcement.
20. This point was made by Sheikh (1990) .
21. The literature assumes government enforcement is constant. For
example, see H. G. Johnson (1974) and Bhagwati and Srinivasan (197 3) .
22. Cooper (1974) , page 190.
23. Becker (1968) , used a similar approach in his analysis of the
economics of crime . , p . 11.
24 . For a discussion of this problem with the mean-variance
approach, see Deaton and Muellbauer (1987) , pp. 395-405.

